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The frequent metaphor of Tunisia as an island requires reevaluation. An island 
demands continuity unto itself, a feature that Tunisia distinctly lacks. Despite 
higher than usual levels of ethnic and religious homogeneity, Tunisia has 
historically maintained low levels of local-national interaction and 
accommodation. This analysis examines how the post-independence government 
of Habib Bourguiba sought to coax rural and agrarian communities into 
participation in the national identity and thereby promote continuity throughout 
the country via disruptive, large-scale government projects as part of the 
“modernity drive.” Specific attention is given to agricultural cooperatives and 
land collectivization in the 1960s. This analysis is further built on a case study of 
the application and lingering effects of such land policy in the village of Chebika 
– a rural mountain oasis of the Tunisian south representative of the closed off, 
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 Tunisia is often described as an island; not as a matter of geography and 
continuous coastline, but rather as a product of social and cultural cohesion 
frequently at odds with its region dominated by the long-standing conflicts in 
Algeria and Libya. As far back as its generally peaceful transition from French 
protectorate to independent North African state under Prime Minister turned 
President-for-Life Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia has earned accolades from 
throughout the international community, only reinforcing the perception of 
Tunisia as unique within its region – an example of stability and progress alone in 
a sea of discontent. 
 Bourguiba himself made little effort to hide his disaffection for Tunisia’s 
physical location, wishing he could cut his nation away from the southern shores 
of the Mediterranean and push it closer to the European coast. Bourguiba drew 
inspiration from secular Kemalist Turkey and eschewed the call of Nasser’s 
ascendant Arab Nationalism. In so doing he enacted robust, top-down reforms to 
Tunisian society including the Personal Status Code of 1956 enforcing women’s 
rights, the drive for universal primary education with French-language instruction 
within 10 years of independence, and the resettlement of traditionally Berber 
mountain villages like Chebika and Tameghza in order to bring services, schools, 
and roads.1 Together these actions amongst innumerable others constituted a self-
styled jihad against underdevelopment, through which Bourguiba hoped to make 
Tunisia yet again an island – an island of modernity. 
                                                     
1 Perkins, Kenneth J. A History of Modern Tunisia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004. 140, 142. 
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 This frequent metaphor of Tunisia as an island is undoubtedly helpful and 
informative, but like many a trope it fails to consider the more holistic image of 
Tunisia. An island demands above all continuity unto itself. It may be more apt to 
call Tunisia an archipelago – a collection of islands closer to one another than 
anything else, but nevertheless distinct. It is worth noting that Tunisia has 
exhibited a greater degree of national cohesion historically than its neighbors in 
North Africa due largely to its small size, generally high level of ethnic and 
religious homogeneity, and a lack of the large geographical barriers that have 
fostered dissident and isolated voices elsewhere in the region.2 Yet, at the same 
time, Tunisia has always suffered from a comparatively low levels of local-
national interaction with subsistence-based production keeping rural communities 
free of the obligation to engage with their urban counterparts beyond obligatory 
interactions such as taxation, conscription, and law and order.3 
Bourguiba understood, possibly with more clarity than any of his post-
colonial contemporaries, that to build a state it would be essential to bring these 
disparate communities under the singular banner of the Tunisian republic. More 
than simply building schools and roads, the modernity project thus sought to coax 
connections between the various islands of the Tunisian archipelago as a part of 
what was described by Ahmed ben Salah – a lead architect of the Bourguiban 
modernity drive and the subject of discussion later in this analysis – as “a 
temporary and inevitable tutelage” comprised of the forceful interjection of 
                                                     
2Larson, Barbara. “Local-National Integration in Tunisia.” Middle Eastern Studies 20.1 (1984). 
18. 
3 Ibid, 19. 
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government into daily life.4 One of the largest areas of concern to the government 
when it came to promoting local-national integration and the vitality of the 
nascent Tunisian state was land and agriculture policy, an issue of fundamental 
importance to daily life for countless Tunisians, especially in the heavily agrarian 
south and northwest of the country. 
The primary task of this analysis is threefold, with each successive 
component narrowing in on the achievement or failure of the Bourguiban 
modernity drive. First, to define and understand the modernity drive itself as a 
tool of statecraft for manufacturing a cohesive national identity; second, to 
scrutinize land and agricultural policy in the 1960s, specifically land 
collectivization and agriculture cooperatives as an essential pillar of Bourguiba’s 
New Republic; and third, to examine a case study of how life in Chebika, an 
isolated mountain oasis in southern Tunisia representative of the country’s rural 
communities, has or has not changed as a result of state land and agriculture 
policy in the name of modernity.  
 
Methodology& Limitations 
The majority of historical background on the role of the Bourguiba 
government in the modernization of Tunisia has been gathered from scholarly 
sources made available through university databases in addition to a handful of 
published works accessed in print. Sources were read in both English and in 
French.  
                                                     
4 qtd. in Vandewalle, Dirk. “From the New State to the New Era: Toward a Second Republic in 
Tunisia.” Middle East Journal 42.4 (1988). 604. 
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Many of the sources consulted are rather dated, some from as far back as 
the 1960s. While these sources offer a helpful picture of the technical process by 
which land reform was activated and carried out, they are largely incapable of 
judging the long-term impact of such actions – which this analysis will hope to 
extrapolate. Previous research, moreover, has primarily concerned itself with 
either the broad strokes of development in Tunisia or minute policies. This 
analysis attempts to connect this narrative of state formation and modernization 
all the way down to the level of the oasis. 
In order to obtain a better understanding of Chebika and how it fits within 
the larger picture of land policy and collectivization under Bourguiba’s 
modernity drive I conducted a research trip to Chebika and the neighboring oasis 
town of Tameghza. This trip served the dual purpose of allowing me to explore 
the city and the oasis at Chebika in person as well as to conduct personal 
interviews with various citizens and gatekeepers within the city. I was 
accompanied on this trip by Huda Mzioudet who served as a translator and guide.  
Although such a trip was essential to my ability to conduct this research, 
there were inherent limitations associated with it, most notably the relative 
brevity of the trip (only four days – just one of which was spent in the city of 
Chebika itself). I was unable to ask follow up questions after the original 
interviews were conducted due to the difficulty in accessing the subjects. This 
proved problematic when the project took on a slightly different focus 
(agricultural collectives) after the interviews were already completed.  
Additionally, the topic of land and land ownership remains a sensitive one 
in Chebika and although I developed an array of contacts capable of speaking on 
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the subject, it is important to take some of the answers with a grain of salt and 
understand their potential biases. Jean Duvignaud – a French sociologist who 
spent the years 1960-1966 studying the city and whose subsequent work Change 
at Shebika: Report from a North African Village will be referenced frequently in 
this analysis – observed the inherent difficulty of determining land ownership 
with it taking in some cases over a year of research and interaction for subjects to 
admit that they were no longer the actual owners of their land.5 Land has 
historically functioned as a source of tremendous pride and self-worth in the 
Tunisian south so even today many farmers may not be willing to openly disclose 
true ownership arrangements. 
The interviews themselves were conducted in accordance with standard 
policies for the protection of human subjects. Subjects were provided with 
information on their rights (including their right to decline to answer a question 
or conclude the interview at any moment) in advance of the interview via a 
consent form, the content of which is available in the appendix. The form was 
available in English and French and in the case that a subject was not literate in 
one of those languages the content of the form was relayed verbally in Tunisian-
dialect Arabic by my translator.  
Subjects were also granted anonymity for their participation and their 
names as well as those of the specific organizations that individuals represent 
have been removed or sufficiently altered to prevent identification. Transcripts of 
the interviews were made, except in the case of one informal interview with a 
local farmer, and are available in the appendix. The original audio recordings 
                                                     
5Duvignaud, Jean. Change at Shebika: Report from a North African Village. New York, NY: 
Random House/Vintage Books, 1970. p. 81 
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have been deleted. Upon reviewing the transcripts, a translator was used – the 
transcripts are word-for-word although the first-person and the third-person were 
used alternatingly. The use of translation services is also a limitation to the extent 
that there are no direct quotations available in the exact syntax of the subject. 
 
Discussion/Analysis 
The Bourguiban State: Enemy of Underdevelopment 
The Theoretical Foundations of the Bourguiban State 
 The Tunisian sense of superiority is largely attributable, at least in the 
post-colonial moment and subsequent few decades, to the policies and vision of 
President-for-Life Habib Bourguiba. While many of his fellow nationalist party 
leaders across the Arab World sought to establish personal and political 
legitimacy through violent action and rhetoric against their former colonists, 
Bourguiba embarked on a rather different project of state-building inspired by 
socialism, paternalism, and an often veiled sense ofsecularism. Above all, 
however, each of Bourguiba’s theoretical impulses was mediated by an 
overarching sense of pragmatism. This sense of pragmatism was on display for 
the world to see when Bourguiba ignored the violent objections of other Arab 
leaders and chose to accept internal autonomy from France in 1955 rather than 
demand full independence.6 Bourguiba claimed that other events in North Africa, 
notably next door in Algeria, would soon cause the French to grant full 
independence regardless and it was more important to maintain a functional 
                                                     
6Hahn, Lorne. “Tunisia Pragmatism and Progress.” Middle East Journal 16.1 (1962). 18. 
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relationship with the French for the time being. He was proven correct within a 
year. 
 Bourguiba was influenced by socialist writers throughout his schooling 
and made frequent reference to the likes of Mao, Trotsky, and Khrushchev in his 
public speeches and writings.7 Socialism, for Bourguiba, was primarily a matter 
of promoting the national welfare before that of the individual. In pursuit of an 
improved national welfare, Bourguiba began to adopt an increasingly 
paternalistic approach to governance. Bourguiba acted at times with little regard 
for traditional social or cultural structures within the country, acting as if he alone 
knew what his countrymen needed.8 Such paternalism and socialism combined to 
form an increasing authoritarianism in Bourguiba’s actions and the development 
of a strong cult of personality. Through various displays of pageantry, including 
elaborate celebrations of Bourguiba’s birthday and weekly addresses by 
Bourguiba in the style of President Roosevelt, Bourguiba styled himself as the 
nation’s founding father, demanding the collective trust to make decisions for 
all.9, 10 
Perhaps most consequential to Bourguiba’s attempt to impose modernity 
on Tunisia is his sometimes veiled sense of secularism. Bourguiba viewed overt 
Islam in Tunisia as a threat. One of his first actions was the passage of the 
Personal Status Code of 1956 that, among other things, was noteworthy for 
abolishing polygamy and arbitrary divorce as well as a number of other measures 
                                                     
7Mestiri, Brahim. “La Pensée Politique et Sociale du President Habib Bourguiba.” PhD diss., 
Université d’Ottawa, 2002. 177. 
8 Perkins. History of Modern Tunisia. 145. 
9 Hahn. “Pragmatism and Progress.” 23. 
10 Larson. “Local-National Integration.” 20. 
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targeted at women’s liberation.11 These actions constituted Bourguiba’s attempt 
at a social revolution within Tunisia following independence. Yet in recognizing 
that they were not necessarily unanimously supported decisions, Bourguiba 
utilized Islamic jurisprudence (albeit moderate and reformist jurisprudence) to 
justify them thereby veiling the full extent of his secularism.  
The “modernity drive” embodies the confluence of Bourguiba’s 
ideological foundations – socialism, paternalism, secularism, and pragmatism. 
Decrying the laissez-faire approach of classical liberalism, Bourguiba declared a 
formal jihad against chronic under-development (“moral, cultural, and material”) 
in 1960.12 Bourguiba’s jihad exempted all Tunisian citizens from fasting during 
Ramadan and urged them to continue to work instead of resting. This decision 
was justified under the Quranic exception that warriors do not have to fast or rest 
during the religious holiday.13 By drafting all Tunisians into the now-literal fight 
against under-development, Bourguiba made it abundantly clear what his 
prerogatives as President were.  
The Bourguiban Modernity Drive in Action 
 The concept of modernity itself is inherently difficult to define and relies 
heavily on subjectivities and matters of personal interpretation. Thus it is 
important to operationalize the term by the definition used by its perpetrator. 
Used in this analysis, “the modernity drive” does not refer to a philosophical 
articulation of what it means to be modern, but rather is a reference to a specific 
                                                     
11Brown, L. Carl. “Bourguiba and Bourguibism Revisited: Reflections and Interpretation.” Middle 
East Journal 55.1 (2001). 56. 
12 Mestiri. “Pensée Politique et Sociale.” 184. 
13 Perkins. History of Modern Tunisia. 145. 
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set of policy actions taken by Bourguiba following independence which includes 
the agricultural cooperative and land collectivization project of 1960-1969, as 
well as other dirigist actions including dramatic reforms to education, social 
institutions, and religious organizations.  
 The modernity drive was not a fundamentally charitable action engineered 
by Bourguiba to increase quality of life throughout Tunisia. Improvements in 
national infrastructure and economic opportunity were essential to the success of 
the nascent Tunisian republic on the verge of a demographic explosion. In 1956 
the country had a birthrate as high as 2 percent a year (one of the highest rates in 
the world at the time), a majority of the population under the age of 21, and only 
40 percent of working age adults were formally employed with an average per 
capita income of 127 USD a year.14 Bourguiba was also acutely aware that his 
political longevity and that of his Neo-Destour Party (to be renamed the Destour 
Socialist Party in 1964) would be well served by the aggressive expansion of its 
ranks through the direct penetration of the national government into local life 
through massive public works projects. 
 Bourguiba obtained unquestioned control over the modernity drive and its 
various projects through most of the 1960s by actively seeking to coopt other 
actors – some who would otherwise have the potential to rival the mandate of the 
Neo-Destour party. Through the establishment of the National Planning Council 
in 1958, Bourguiba sought to connect representatives of major national labor 
organizations including the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT – 
the most powerful labor organization in Tunisia), the Union Nationale des 
                                                     
14 Hahn. “Pragmatism and Progress.” 20. 
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Agriculteurs Tunisiens, and the Union Tunisien des Industriels et Commerçants 
with government officials.15 Bourguiba also coopted prominent leaders from 
these organizations into senior roles within his government, most notably and 
relevant to the subsequent analysis of agricultural cooperatives was his invitation 
of Ahmed ben Salah, former Secretary-General of the UGTT, to serve in a 
number of different high-level posts including the Ministries of Public Health, 
Social Affairs, Planning, Finance, the Economy, and Education. 
 Although the goal of the modernity drive was to facilitate interaction 
between locals and the government to promote integration, the resulting 
collaborations were not always equal or productive. The ambassadors sent out by 
the national government to local communities often did not share local values and 
norms, which often lead to criticism of the rural mentalité as being conservative, 
fatalistic, irrational, and risk averse.16These critiques of rural society often 
devolved into a paternalistic echo chamber that galvanized authoritarian behavior, 
an effect described as “Pygmalion syndrome” whereby reform-minded elites who 
found no suitable response among society for their reforms consequently 
radicalized in their actions, which made the ultimate goal of reform increasingly 
difficult to achieve.17 Local goals including an increased quality of life and long-
term survival often fell at odds with national development goals that operated in 
the short-term. The government could have avoided such difficulties if it 
considered empowering local actors who were well versed in the social and 
                                                     
15 Perkins. History of Modern Tunisia. 150. 
16Bellin, Eva. Review of Development and Disenchantment in Rural Tunisia: The Bourguiba 
Years, by Mira Zussman. Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 27.2 (1993). 235. 
17 Vandewalle. “From the New State to the New Era.” 604. 
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cultural traditions or worldview of a certain community to be liaisons with the 
state instead of sending in party supporters and technocrats.  
Land Reform as Statecraft: 1960-1969 
The Agricultural Economy at Independence 
During the colonial period, French commercial farmers accounted for a 
disproportionately high level of agricultural output relative to their number and 
the amount of land that they owned. Colonists had access to the most fertile 
lands, usually in the country’s northwestern areas such as Bizerte, and modern 
farming machinery and techniques.18 The subsequent withdrawal of most 
commercial farmers and associated capital following Tunisian independence left 
some of the country’s most fertile lands fallow, held by the state following 
expropriation and occasionally land transactions between colonists and the newly 
independent government – although the former was more common.  
Overall agricultural production fell to a fraction of its pre-1956 levels 
despite the vast majority of Tunisians – some 75 percent – engaged in the 
agricultural sector either formally or as a matter of subsistence.19Despite the 
significant amount of Tunisians engaged in agriculture, it generated only one-
third of the national income following independence.20 This disparity was the 
result of various factors including soil erosion from frequent and heavy 
inundations (which the average farmer was unaware how to combat), primitive 
methods of land exploitation, and the inability to use the habus (potentially fertile 
                                                     
18 Perkins. History of Modern Tunisia. 149. 




lands owned by religious orders) for farming which altogether equaled the 
destruction or waste of 25,000 acres of land every year.21 Countless other acres of 
land were also rendered fallow or vacant as the result of scattered and fractured 
landownership, especially is the country’s rural oases in the south, notably 
Chebika. 
Agricultural Cooperatives in Theory 
Agricultural reform therefore became a central tenant of the development 
project. Its importance to independence was acknowledged as early as the 1955 
national congress of the Neo-Destour Party in Sfax and codified in the first 10 
Year Plan. Ahmed ben Salah as head of the Ministry of Planning was the chief 
architect behind the land collectivization and agricultural cooperative project that 
was designed to address the looming agricultural crisis. Ben Salah’s appointment 
to the Ministry of Planning marked a clear decision by Bourguiba to pursue a 
more aggressive, socialist policy towards the country’s economy. 
The reasoning behind the project was simple enough, that starting with 
the expropriated colon estates (those belonging to the former French colonists) in 
the northwest the government would nationalize major land plots and gradually 
incorporate smaller plots and individual parcels held by farmers. Once 
nationalized, these lands would increase in yield as a result of better access to 
modern farming technologies and government direction, the additional yields 
would then more than meet the demand of the growing population.22 The 
surpluses could then be prepared for export and fund the development of other 
                                                     
21 Ibid, 22. 
22 Perkins. History of Modern Tunisia. 154. 
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sectors within the economy. A major hope was that the export of excess 
agricultural goods would make up for the lack of foreign capital in order to fund 
the further development of industry like the extraction of phosphates, iron, and 
zinc. By 1961 the government had acquired nearly 4,000,000 acres of habus and 
7,400,000 acres of land that was previously held at the tribal level in addition to 
the restoration of the colon lands to the national farming project.23 
The theoretical origins of the agricultural cooperatives are well placed 
within the overarching paternalism and socialism of the Bourguiban modernity 
drive with collectivization seeking to establish public ownership over the means 
of production. Due in part to incomplete trust between the government and 
farmers as well as the socialist desire to increase state employment, the 
agricultural cooperatives also spawned a large technocratic class of 
administrators and farm managers, though many proved to lack rudimentary 
knowledge of rural society and farming techniques. By 1968 the cooperatives 
fully included more than one third of all rural land and one quarter of the rural 
population.24 
 Not only did agricultural cooperatives appear to be a solution to the 
Tunisian economic crisis of early independence, but the practice also sought to 
bridge rural-urban disparities and promote local-national integration. During the 
period of agricultural cooperatives, government penetration into rural 
communities reached its height between ramped up social services, an increase in 
political activity and representation, and in many localities virtual government 
                                                     
23 Hahn. “Pragmatism and Progress.” 27. 
24 Perkins. History of Modern Tunisia. 154. 
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control over the economy.25 Such a massive mobilization of government 
resources was often Trojan-horsed into these communities as a part of the 
collectivization efforts. While one should not assume that attempts to coerce rural 
communities into a dirigist national identity was the primary motivation behind 
one of North Africa’s largest land use projects in the post-colonial era, it was 
more than a tacit factor in ben Salah and Bourguiba’s cost-benefit analysis. 
Agricultural Cooperatives in Practice 
 The need to divide “agricultural cooperatives in theory” from 
“agricultural cooperatives in practice” should offer a hint as to the execution of 
what was supposed to be a magic bullet for the Tunisian economy. The resulting 
economic and social dislocations from the massive reorientation of state 
agriculture policy had major unintended consequences for Tunisia’s developing 
economy. The Tunisian government, true to form, thought that it would avoid the 
pitfalls of major statist projects elsewhere in the region, yet: 
As in Egypt, a parasitic private sector … emerged at the margin of state 
enterprises. As in Algeria, high savings and capital accumulation rates 
were offset by weak managerial expertise, technical problems within 
agricultural cooperatives and public enterprises, and government support 
of an inefficient public sector.26 
 Public opinion towards the cooperatives rapidly soured as promised 
wages failed to appear, amounting to only one third of the original projection by 
1968.27 Wages remained low due to a combination of factors including the low 
prices at which the government chose to buy the agricultural goods (cooperatives 
                                                     
25 Larson. “Local-National Integration.” 19. 
26 Vandewalle. “From the New State to the New Era.” 605. 
27 Perkins. History of Modern Tunisia. 155. 
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had no choice but to sell their harvests to the government at the pre-determined 
rate), a series of poor harvests nationally between 1964 and 1968, and lengthy 
gestation periods as land was turned over from less profitable wheat production 
to more profitable crops such as olives and citrus.28 The situation was so bad that 
the 1960s saw and overall drop in agricultural production and by 1969 only 15 
percent of over 250 cooperatives were running at a profit.29 
 Of those cooperatives that did succeed in turning a profit, the government 
was especially proud. One such cooperative that the Bourguiba government 
trumpeted as a success of the cooperative system was the project in the Mejerda 
Valley of south-central Tunisia. The cooperative project there was successful in 
financing a sprawling irrigation and drainage network that connected and 
supported 35,000 acres of farmland.30 However, such success stories were 
increasingly rare as agricultural cooperatives continued to expand in Tunisia. 
Determined to salvage his policy, ben Salah made the decision to bring all 
remaining farmlands in the country under collective control in 1969, a decision 
that sparked serious unrest amongst large landholders who had previously been 
left alone without threat of having their lands collectivized.31 
 Forms of resistance to the collectivization of lands were abundant 
throughout the 1960s. Originally the low-level farmers and small landholders 
protested by robbing and vandalizing bakeries (largely associated with the 
government as the result of grain subsidies), organizing walk-outs, and damaging 
                                                     
28 Ibid, 156. 
29 Ibid, 156. 
30 Hahn. “Pragmatism and Progress.” 27. 
31 Perkins. History of Modern Tunisia. 157. 
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olive groves by digging up and replanting the trees with their roots in the air.32 
These protests were easily ignored by the government and local administrators 
and did little to prevent the cooperative project from going national.  
Another act of resistance that became widespread and shows just how 
much unintended consequences of land collectivization subverted the original 
intentions of the project is that many farmers, aware of the coming 
collectivization, chose to sell their land before it could be confederated into the 
cooperative system.33 In this way a socialist project had the ironic and 
counterintuitive result of exacerbating the disparities between small, poor farmers 
who chose to sell their land for fear of having it seized and the large landowners 
who benefited from these sales, often at below the full value of the land.  
Socialism by definition is meant to render the means of production as a 
public good, yet the knee-jerk reaction of farmers to sell resulted in further the 
estrangement of the proletariat class from the land as the essential means of 
production. The farmers were left with only their labor as capital and most ended 
up workers or khammes on the land they once owned.34 The status of landowners-
turned-landless workers only further deteriorated once the cooperative project 
reached them because all cooperative workers were paid a wage fixed by the 
government and were banned from seeking additional or alternative employment 
outside of the agricultural sphere.35 Adjusted for inflation and alterations to the 
cost of living, the average coopérateur (the name given to farmers who worked 
                                                     
32 Simmons, John. L. “Agricultural Cooperatives and Tunisian Development.” Middle East 
Journal 25.1 (1971). 53. 
33 Ibid, 46. 
34 Ibid, 47. 
35 Ibid, 49. 
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the land under the cooperative system) was no better off working in a state-run 
collective farm in 1969 than on a French colon estate in 1955 – and even then 
workers on the colon estates were often allowed to seek alternative opportunities 
in the informal sector such as growing gardens and selling the produce from 
them.36 
 The peasantry thus began to search openly for the so-called benefits of 
independence, with many arriving at the conclusion that the rewards of 
independence were unequally distributed with urban centers like Tunis and the 
sahel (the eastern coast of Tunisia including cities such as Sfax, Mahdia, and 
Monastir the birthplace of Bourguiba) benefiting at the expense of the interior. As 
a policy meant to support integration between the urban elite and rural poor, 
agricultural cooperatives did little to increase peasant participation at the national 
level.37 While there were isolated efforts at increasing the bargaining power of 
peasants in negotiations on matters including salaries and representation, such 
attempts merited little success. The biggest benefit to the rural poor was the 
introduction of streets, schools, clinics and other tangible representations of 
modern culture; however, the overarching goal of promoting buy-in to the state 
was ultimately not well served by the agricultural cooperatives of the 1960s that 
left most locals feeling taken advantage of and deceived. 
The End of Land Cooperatives in Tunisia 
 The conclusion of the cooperative project in September of 1969 left few 
winners. Outraged by ben Salah’s stubborn insistence on pursuing cooperatives, 
                                                     
36 Ibid, 49-50. 
37 Ibid, 50. 
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attempts to circumvent executive authority and the national party in matters of 
land distribution, and alienation of the powerful landed elite from which 
Bourguiba and his party drew extensive support Bourguiba revoked ben Salah’s 
ministerial portfolios and pursued charges of treason against his once protégé.38 
The charges stuck and ben Salah was tried and convicted. He escaped from 
imprisonment and fled abroad in 1973 where he stayed until Bourguiba’s death in 
2000.  
The charges against ben Salah may not have been fully merited – the 
goals of the ten-year plan were established three years prior to ben Salah 
receiving the agriculture portfolio and fit well within the overall modernity drive 
initiated by Bourguiba himself.39 Nevertheless, the legal charges against ben 
Salah were largely unimportant. The true charge against ben Salah was economic 
mismanagement. Whether agricultural cooperatives were bound to fail or ben 
Salah’s management is solely responsible is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
What is valuable is to see the multiple levels on which it failed to promote much 
desired local-national integration. 
 Amidst the fallout of ben Salah’s trial and conviction, the government 
distanced itself from the policy of mandatory land collectivization which was by 
then widely perceived as corrupt and attempting to eliminate private ownership in 
Tunisia. Farmers who were already participating in the cooperative system were 
permitted to withdraw and a moratorium was placed on the collectivization of 
further lands.40 The former colon estates in the northwest remained in the 
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cooperative system as the government possessed full title to those lands. These 
collective farms continued to find success.  
The damage elsewhere, however, to rural society and landownership was 
already done. Many farmers having sold their lands for fear of confiscation 
earlier in the 1960s were unable to reclaim their lost capital and found themselves 
either permanently resigned to the status of day laborer or were forced out of the 
agricultural sphere entirely. Those who stayed as laborers often found themselves 
falling into debt to their employers and those who pursued work in the cities 
rarely found it, both types frequently found themselves forced to live in 
bidonvilles (shantytowns common throughout colonial North Africa) in a repeat 
of the economic hardships under the French.41 Disenfranchisement therefore 
became widespread throughout the rural communities that had seen their 
economic standing either plateau or dramatically deteriorate over the course of 
the past decade. 
 As a tool of statecraft, agricultural cooperatives in Tunisia were better 
policy than practice. They failed to inspire real growth in the agricultural sector, 
only further estranged workers from their means of production, and nearly cost 
Bourguiba’s modernity drive its sense of legitimacy. The channels of 
communication and accommodation that were forced open by the blunt 
instrument of land collectivization were largely slammed closed following the 
project’s conclusion by angry farmers yearning for the time when they were able 
to simply use the land to support themselves and their families. Consequently, the 
Bourguiban modernity drive was saved by virtue of other projects outside the 
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scope of this analysis including the aggressive promotion of education and 
women’s rights. Were Bourguiba’s jihad to be evaluated on land alone, history 
and many Tunisians would not look back as kindly on their nation’s founding 
father.  
Chebika: A Case Study in Continuity and Change 
 Chebika functions as a compelling and accessible case study of the 
successes and failures of land and agricultural reform within the Bourguiban 
modernity project for a number of reasons: 1) Chebika remained largely isolated 
from the rest of Tunisia up to and through the independence decade with only a 
small amount of mediated interactions between its population and the state; 2) 
agricultural activity within the oasis has always been at the center of life in 
Chebika as a means of subsistence; 3) there is a large amount of continuity 
amongst the population at Chebika with families that have lived there and shared 
experiences for generations, offering credibility to the study of their oral 
histories; and 4) extensive study of the city was conducted by a team of French 
sociologists led by Jean Duvignaud between 1960 and 1966. Thus when one 
seeks to understand the extent to which large-scale land reform and agricultural 
cooperatives were able to coerce those living on the fringe of Tunisian society 
into active participation in the new state, Chebika is a useful example. 
History of Chebika 
 In order to assess the change at Chebika, or possible lack thereof, inspired 
by Ahmed ben Salah’s land cooperative project and other land and agriculture 
based initiatives, it is important to first place Chebika within its appropriate 
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historical context. Originally called Qasr al-Shams (Castle of the Sun), Chebika 
lays claim to being one of the furthest reaches of the Roman empire into Africa – 
a claim backed up by the remains of military fortification and rusted weaponry 
long since repurposed into ploughs.42 At the time of Duvignaud’s research in the 
1960s, Chebika was comprised of roughly 30 families with population estimates, 
for lack of census or records or real concern for such classification, between 200 
and 300.43 This number has held roughly steady today with only minor variations 
due to studying or foreign employment. Individuals in the area moreover claim 
that these are the same people who have been living in Chebika and the 
surrounding areas for upwards of the last 1,800 years.44 The Chebika sense of self 
is inextricably tied in to its long history.  
Chebika is further distinct as a mountain oasis – a relatively rare 
geological phenomenon that has enabled communal life for such a length of time. 
The waters that have provided locals with a subsistence-based lifestyle originate 
from within the mountain itself. The walls of the mountain have acted as much to 
keep Chebika contained as the stretches of desert all around have acted to blunt 
the spread of the city. 
 Chebika’s first major interactions with government in Tunisia related to 
perhaps the most traumatic event in the city’s recent memory. In 1969 there was a 
major inundation that resulted in the destruction of many of the city’s homes and 
buildings which were built out of natural building materials like mud, stone, and 
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wood.45 Following the flooding of the old city – which mirrored a similar event 
and relocation in Tameghza, another mountain oases and the nearest town to 
Chebika at a distance of approximately 17 kilometers – residents began to rebuild 
at the base of the mountain only a few hundred meters away from the original 
city. They received assistance from the government during the subsequent 
relocation and reconstruction, particularly in the contribution of modern building 
materials including concrete and steel.46 Relocation assistance constituted a one-
time project from the government intended for the finite purpose of relocation 
and while it does connect to the overarching drive towards modernization by the 
Bourguiba government it is not on par with land collectivization and agricultural 
policy as a deliberate tool of long-term and methodical government infiltration 
into local life. 
 As opposed to large cities in the area such as Tozeur and Naftah where 
disparate parcels of land gradually fell under the ownership of a small number of 
individuals and were confederated into large plots, in Chebika the largest parcels 
do not exceed a few acres and are often loosely defined with borders delineated 
by improvised fences and barbed wire.47, 48 At the time of Duvignaud’s research 
he tallied the parcels at 176 with 47 different owners, though he continued to 
struggle with an exact number of land owners due to the sensitivity of 
landownership and the desire of many men in Chebika to hide the fact that they 
had lost direct ownership of land that was previously in their families for 
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centuries.49 The most common relationship between men in Chebika and the land 
they worked was that of a khammes (derived from the Arabic word for five) – 
roughly similar to an indentured servant who would tend a parcel of land and all 
of its palms in order to receive 1/5 of the crop as payment. The primary crops of 
the oasis in Chebika have always been palm dates, olives, and other foods 
necessary for subsistence including carrots, onions, and grains.50 
Chebika’s Experience with Land Collectivization 
 Although land collectivization was a component of Tunisia’s first major 
economic plan since independence in 1962, Chebika did not experience the direct 
action of land seizure and collectivization until 1969 – a testament to resistance 
amongst the city’s farmers and the support for private ownership, but above all 
attributable to the remote nature of life in Chebika which had no French 
interaction or colon estates to speak of.51 In general, agricultural cooperatives 
were set up more rapidly in the north of the country where the colon lands were 
easily expropriated. They then made their way down to the larger cities in the 
South such as Tozeur. In both of these instances, the cooperatives were 
comparatively easy to set-up as a result of the large amounts of farmland already 
collected into large plots either by the French or the landowners who had 
amassed sizable plots in the larger oases. By the time Chebika finally began the 
process of collectivizing its farming, ben Salah and his cooperative policy in 
general were nearing their end. 
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 Despite their belated start, the farmers at Chebika labored through the 
process of collectivization just like any other rural city in Tunisia at the time. All 
176 parcels of land were nationalized and placed in the trust of the farmers as a 
collective union. It is clear to see how ben Salah and Bourguiba hoped to use the 
collectivization of farm land as a way to gather the political and nationalist 
support of poor or landless farmers like the khammes. One might expect this 
action to be especially salient in Chebika where, prior to land collectivization, the 
lands were largely owned by outsiders to the community including miners from 
Redayif, farmers from nearby Tameghza, and interestingly also Bedouins who 
grazed their herds in the nearby areas.52 Yet, across multiple interviews, the land 
collectivization of 1969 emerged as a sensitive issue still to this day in Chebika.  
There were those who benefited in this way from the collectivization – 
farmers who owned no palm trees before that period, but acquired trees as a 
result.53 But responses were not universally positive, at least in part because the 
collectivization process turned a blind eye to the centuries of private ownership 
and hard work that had become central to the ethos of the Chebikan farmer. To 
clarify, the idea of private ownership exhibited at Chebika, at least historically, is 
less a matter of physically owning the land, but rather is a process of working the 
land and making it fruitful as an almost religious, alms-giving activity.  
Duvignaud noted that in his experience in Chebika: 
None of the khammes or the owners looks at his piece of land as we do in 
the West: as a possession which yields a certain profit. For fifty or sixty of 
the eighty workers whom we questioned, land is a part of the divine 
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creation which, through man’s work, participates in the transcendent, 
mystical process that leads every living thing to…sprout or grow.54 
 This sensitivity to the issue of land collectivization was apparent 
throughout the interviews conducted. Interestingly while most other historical 
events at question were readily accessible to interview subjects via oral history 
(the relocation of the city, developments in the tourism sector, etc.), any answer 
to the question of land collectivization was prefaced by saying that they were not 
familiar or had a very limited recollection.55, 56 In a sense it almost seems as 
though the issue of land collectivization was removed from the oral history of 
Chebika, or at least it was too sensitive a topic to address substantively with an 
unfamiliar researcher. 
 Ultimately when the national policy of land collectivization was jettisoned 
from the national jihad against underdevelopment and ben Salah from the 
government, Chebika began the process of returning the collectivized lands to 
their previous owners. Although there was no information available on the 
process through which lands were returned or reassigned it would be an 
interesting area for further study. The majority of lands were easily given back to 
their prior title-holders, but it does appear that there were some farmers who were 
able to leave the collectivization experiment with more land or trees than they 
had prior – a source of continued bad blood within the community.57 By 1970 the 
attempt at collectivization formally concluded in Chebika and the majority of 
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farmers returned to the previous exploitation of their own land without any state 
interventions.58 
Long-term Effects of Land Policy in Chebika 
 The first and foremost effect of the failure of land collectivization that 
roiled the government has been a persistent hesitancy from subsequent 
administrators to address land policy in a large and systematic way. Although 
there is ample justification for this pause, it has resulted in a purposeful neglect of 
communities such as Chebika where agriculture has always maintained a position 
of primary importance. The very issues that land collectivization was set to solve 
– low productivity of land due to over farming, primitive farming techniques, and 
scattered claims to land ownership – continued to plague Chebika following the 
restoration of private land management.  
Across all four of the interviews conducted with subjects who lived in 
Chebika, scattered land ownership in the oasis was identified as a major problem 
for life in Chebika today. The scattered ownership of lands resulting from divided 
inheritance, the use of lands to pay debts and dowries, and the outright 
abandonment of certain lands has long been viewed as an obstacle to rejuvenating 
or increasing production within the oasis.59, 60 The scattered ownership often 
results in full parcels allowed to become fallow as former landowners or the 
children of former landowners or khammes simply walk away from the 
agricultural lifestyle in favor of other sectors including tourism, the service 
sector, and others. 
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 The awareness of this issue of scattered ownership is promising; however, 
little concrete action has been taken to resolve it – but not for lack of trying. 
Interview subjects detailed previous attempts to involve the national government 
more directly in the management and distribution of lands.61 Another previous 
proposal originated by a civil society organization in Chebika went a step further 
to request assistance in developing a new modern oasis entirely which could be 
used to reinvigorate agricultural production in the city.62 There is an ongoing 
project to rejuvenate the oasis and increase interest in land cultivation by teaching 
the introduction of a three strata oasis system (the stratification of crop type so 
that there are three layers with date palms, fruit trees, like apple trees, olive trees, 
or vines, and ground vegetables like carrots and onions) to diversify and increase 
output per parcel.63 This latest project, however, is funded not by the Tunisian 
government but by the World Bank’s Global Environment Facility with a grant of 
nearly $6 million USD split between various projects in southern Tunisia.64 
 The desire exists within Chebika to make serious reforms to this issue of 
scattered land ownership. Yet, the government does not appear willing to reinsert 
itself into local farming affairs in a large and systematic way. This unwillingness 
to assist in projects may be in part the result of the weakened national state due to 
the revolution in 2011 and ongoing democratic consolidation, but it is also a clear 
outcome of the failed agricultural policy of the 1960s which featured a strong and 
forceful interjection of government in to daily life in the oasis. Although there are 
some examples of partnerships from Chebika to the international level, this is not 
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viewed as a sufficient alternative to a close partnership with the state due to 
myriad bureaucratic hurdles and burdensome requirements after receiving 
funding.65, 66 
Assessing the Success or Failure of Government Action in Chebika 
 The concern of this analysis has not been simply to ask if land 
collectivization succeeded as a policy. The answer to that question is more a 
matter of fact and history than an ongoing debate within the academic 
community. Rather, this analysis has sought to situate the land collectivization 
policy of the 1960s within the broader picture of Bourguiba’s modernity drive as 
a tool for statecraft intended to promote national unity by coercing local-national 
interaction and interconnectedness. So the question, then, is:  Did it work in 
Chebika? 
 Although the quantity of communication between Chebika and greater 
Tunisia has increased, there has not been a corresponding increase in the sense of 
Chebika as a part of Tunisia. One Chebika resident described living there to 
Duvignaud by saying, “Nobody cares about Chebika. We’re the tail of the 
fish…”67 The quotation could have easily come from one of the interviews 
conducted just this past month.  
There has come to exist a sense of nostalgia, that things were better and 
simpler in Chebika before the relocation of the town and forceful interjection of 
government into agriculture with one interview subject even going so far as to 
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refer to the earlier times as “the Golden Age of Chebika.”68 It is not so much that 
residents of Chebika look at their modern amenities including internet and plasma 
TVs with disdain, but rather that they yearn for a time when they were not 
dependent on projects outside of their city and their control. Further examples of 
Chebika being failed by the outside community are numerous including the five 
entrepreneurs from Sidi Bouzid who came to address deficiencies in potable 
water nearly half a decade ago only to abandon the project and the stalled Italian 
water reclamation project that sits like a UFO atop the city.69, 70 
 To the extent that the Bourguiban modernity drive sought to coax 
interactions between locals and the national level, the infrastructure set up to 
support the projects was largely extractive in nature. The schools that were set up 
throughout the country and in Chebika as well were intended to identify talented 
individuals and offer them employment far away from their rural home. Roads as 
well were set up with the interests of the state exceeding those of the local 
community. In Chebika for example, the roads that were built following 
independence were not accompanied by any proliferation in transportation or 
accessibility for those who do not have vehicles of their own. The naql rifi (the 
long-distance rural taxi) makes its way through Chebika only once a day, which 
poses major problems for residents who try to work in or commute to other major 
cities in the area such as Tozeur or Tameghza. So while roads and other physical 
manifestations of modernity exist now for rural communities as a result of the 
modernity drive, their utility rarely does. 
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 Duvignaud identified three conflicting forces at work in Chebika as he 
was leaving in 1966, all of which remain relevant to Tunisia today: 1) that of the 
system of the large-scale exploitation of the land; 2) that of the modern economy; 
and 3) that of stagnation in the precarious equilibrium of poverty.71 The first 
conflict can be paraphrased as the remnant appeal of Chebika’s Golden Age, the 
second as ben Salah’s goal and Bourguiba’s hope never materialized due to 
mismanagement, and the third the painful reality of life in Chebika today. The 
modernity drive was well-intentioned and agricultural cooperatives worked in 
theory, but the reality of life in Chebika and elsewhere throughout the period was 
entirely different. Chebika is an example of a community that, incapable of 
distinguishing between the abuses of the colonial era and the collective era, 
turned back in on itself and is only just beginning to again look beyond the 
fortressed walls of its oasis. 
 
Conclusion 
 Although Bourguiba failed to articulate a consistent and functional land 
policy following independence, he was nevertheless successful in crafting a 
unified state. The other aspects of his modernity drive merit independent research 
as well including his policies on women’s rights that enfranchised and activated 
new citizens in the Tunisian enterprise who went on to make substantial 
contributions to society and culture. Bourguiba’s educational reforms, which 
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were later expanded on under the ben Ali government, also deserve credit and 
study for their role in consolidating the Tunisian state. 
 Opportunities for future investigation in this area are abundant, including 
conducting additional research into the successful land collectives such as the 
Mejerda Valley project of which only brief reference is made above. While it is 
easy to chronicle the ways in which land reform failed to increase local-national 
integration, a closer examination of successful projects in the northwest of the 
country could prove similarly informative. I envision a future comparative 
analysis between Chebika and a similar community (in terms of isolation, 
historical significance of subsistence, etc.) in the Tunisian north. A further 
untouched element of the agricultural cooperative policy in this analysis is the 
prevalence of corruption and patronage in determining the allocation of 
resources. Certain communities that came to better grasp the rules of the game 
were able to reap larger benefits from statist interference than others.  
 Though this analysis has been frequently critical of the conceptualization 
and application of the Bourguiban modernity drive and agricultural cooperative 
program, it should not be mistaken as arguing that disparate Tunisian 
communities remain as isolated from one another and the government as ever. 
Recent events in Tunisia that shook the nation and the region like the Jasmine 
Revolution are a testament to the power of various communities communicating 
and coordinating with one another in moments of solidarity. It would also be 
interesting to examine the long-term effects of dirigist policy on rural 
communities today and to what extent those past experience have had on how the 
community views the democratic transition today – has there been an increase in 
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skepticism towards the government? are these communities especially large 
supporters of democracy? if so, do they tend towards liberal, conservative, or 
Islamist beliefs? 
Despite these recently increasing examples of local-national integration, 
the metaphor of Tunisia as a unified island remains premature and misleading. At 
independence Tunisia was comprised of a large number of isolated communities 
functioning as independent islands unto themselves. Bourguiba acknowledged the 
decentralized nature of Tunisian society as a direct challenge to his ability to 
consolidate personal and political control in the state and subsequently embarked 
on an ambitious modernity drive characterized by large statist interjections into 
local life. Among the various policies of Bourguiba’s jihad against under-
development, agricultural cooperatives and land collectivization stand out as 
directly targeted at fostering higher levels of local-national interaction and 
integration. Despite best and increasingly aggressive efforts by the government 
under the direction of Ahmed ben Salah, agricultural cooperatives failed to 
promote national cohesion and often had the opposite result of disenfranchising 
rural farmers and estranging them from the means of production. The case study 
of life in Chebika before and after land collectivization corroborates a picture of 
communities forced open by the interjection of government projects only to be 
left damaged, angry, and struggling by the failed policies. Thus Chebika remains 





Appendix A. Interview Transcripts 
Interview 1 
4/23/2016 – Interview with head of local civil society organization 
Huda Mzioudet, translator 
ITS: Name of organization and primary function of organization? 
#1: He is general coordinator of this NGO. It’s an NGO funded by the World 
Bank for the rehabilitation of the touristic tract of Chebika.  
ITS: Have you lived your entire life in Chebika? Is your family from Chebika, 
how long have you lived here? 
#1: He was born here his whole family is from here. He was born in 1976. His 
father is still alive; he (his father) was a khammes working under another 
landowner.  
ITS: What is an average day for this organization? 
#1: He wanted to add something about the association. That they are heavily 
involved in civil society and that they try to reach out to locals here so their job is 
not only regarding the rehabilitation of the city, but also other aspects of daily life 
of Chebika locals. As an organization because they have taken advantage of the 
democratic transition but also this air of freedom after the Tunisian revolution of 
trying to empower, give more importance to Chebika because as a town that has 
almost always been neglected by the authorities, they’re trying to reach out to 
policy makers and effect life of the locals through empowering them through 
different projects. Not only rehabilitation of the town. And in particular the fact 
that this town is suffering from lack of water – that is one other issue that they are 
dealing with in this association. 
ITS: Having mentioned lack of water, what are some of the other major 
challenges to life today in Chebika? 
#1: There are many challenges unfortunately mainly unemployment, 
marginalization, poverty, we’ve been trying to contact people in charge whether 
at the national or regional level and we’re not really get any reaction from them 
to these issues that we’re facing on a daily basis. And you noticed also when you 




ITS: Would you say that these are similar issues, similar challenges that Chebika 
is facing as it has historically? So prior to its relocation? Are these new problems 
or are they old problems? 
#1: He wanted to ask about if the village is that’s being restored now or after? 
ITS: No, so are these challenges that Chebikans are facing today, are they the 
same challenges that people in the old Chebika faced? 
#1: He did not witness or hasn’t lived through old Chebika. He was born in 1976, 
but from what he has gathered older generation that in 1969 there was a 
relocation of the old population to the new Chebika and new houses were built 
outside of the old town. In 1969 the old town was flooded and many of the 
houses some of them were huts or made of mud and wood and so basically they 
all almost were destroyed so that forced locals to come down to the new town and 
the state has contributed to the building of most of the houses in the new town. 
He remembers when he was young that the current challenges that Chebika is 
facing were not that big challenges back in his childhood because basically life 
was simpler back then and life was just centered around providing for the 
livelihood of families. For the khammes it was centered around working in a 
landowner’s farm and he gets his share of the crop and the landowner would get 
most of the share of the crop of the land that is worked by the indentured servant. 
Life was also just centered around agricultural activities including crops of wheat 
and oasis palm trees, etc. So issues of marginalization or unemployment were not 
on the agenda at the time especially when he was young. 
ITS: Is there a sense amongst the community at all of a sort of nostalgia for life 
before, when life was simpler? And potentially is there a difference in 
perceptions of that between the older generation and the younger generation? 
#1: My main wish is that would go to the old town because life was simpler back 
then but also agriculture activities were more natural. We used to grow 
vegetables and palm trees, more biologically diversified way. Using natural water 
sources. Which is not the case now.  
ITS: Do you believe that there has been a return to the importance of agriculture 
following the decrease in tourism? 
#1: Yes, tourism has been hit hard by the terrorist attacks in the area. So a lot of 
people who used to work in the tourism sector have left and they are extremely 
marginalized. The main problem with agriculture in Chebika especially in the old 
forest here is the scattered ownership of land. We contacted the state to suggest 
that it gives us a new agriculture district, meaning another modern new oasis in 
which we could just grow start new agriculture activity there. The government 
unfortunately did not respond to that plea, not only that but anything regarding 
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this area. We have a project regarding drinkable water that has been launched 5 
years ago and it hasn’t been implemented yet. 
ITS: In regards to the problem of scattered land ownership, who owns land in 
Chebika? 
#1: The lands are owned by locals here but sometimes you have lands that are not 
productive enough and the locals do not know what to do with them so they will 
sell them to nonlocals from Redayif, from Gafsa, Tozeur, or Tameghza in order 
to generate more money out of it. One other reason for this scattered ownership is 
for example when you have a family with the father and his 4 or 5 children and 
he divides the land among his offspring and that contributes to the scattering of 
ownership in Chebika. Because of this issue of scattered land ownership, some of 
the land is no longer fit for any agricultural activity or production.You can notice 
that here in Chebika that there are lands that are still produce agriculture products 
but others are no longer used for such activities. And that’s one consequence of 
this issue of scattered land ownership. 
ITS: So in 1969 there was this attempt at land collectivization from what we 
heard yesterday. Which then failed by 1970. Amongst farmers in Chebika and 
Tameghza. If you’re familiar with it can you talk about why it failed? 
#1: From what he remembers, from during that year all of the lands were 
collected under one land. All farmers were forced to labor the land, to plant crops 
together, and that was the only souvenir (memory) of this collectivization period. 
ITS: Was that a decision made collectively by the farmers or imposed by the 
government? 
#1: It was imposed by the government This issue of collectivization is extremely 
sensitive in Chebika. Even talking about it can be very sensitive because it has so 
many sides to the issue. There are people who benefitted a lot from the 
collectivization experience. For instance, there were some farmers who did not 
own any palm trees before that period and thanks to that experience of 
collectivization they were able to own palm trees. This is according to what 
people have said. It can be true, it can be exaggerated, it can be wrong.  
ITS: In what ways is Chebika more connected to Tunisia today than it was 
historically or has that not improved much? 
#1: He would call the era when things were simpler as the Golden Age of 
Chebika. Because at the time locals did not need to move a lot to neighboring 
areas because they were working the lands and were self-sufficient. But 
unfortunately since the post-independence government made things even worse 
for Chebika regarding two issues: potable water and public transport. Chebika is 
still suffering from almost a complete absence of public transportation. They 
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have been petitioning to the Tunisian government to provide the town with 
decent public transportation, unfortunately that hasn’t been addressed yet. There 
was an attempt to have the rural transport but it is not enough because it is still 
making connection between Tameghza which is more or less where Chebika 
depends on administratively speaking at the level of the district and Tozeur to 
which they depend on the regional level. And at least they were not really asking 
for frequent transport to Tameghza but at least something that would connect 
Chebika to neighboring Tozeur and Tameghza with something that would ease 
communication or connection between the two neighboring towns.  
ITS: When the government fails to provide assistance are there any specific ways 
in which people in Chebika have attempted themselves to rectify these situations? 
#1: They usually resort to the private sector. For example, if there’s a local of 
Chebika who will use his car or his van to ease transportation between 
neighboring areas to Chebika.  
ITS: If you could outline the problems with potable water in Chebika. 
#1: 5 years ago in 2011 there was a project for potable water. 5 entrepreneurs 
they came to address this issue and start a project. Unfortunately, the whole 
project has failed ever since. This association tried to see with the local 
authorities and with the governor, but there was no response to that unfortunately. 
The entrepreneurs that were on this project they claimed that the plastic canals 
that could be used for the portable water project were costly which explains why 
the project was stopped. 
ITS: So when the projects are looking for assistance do they look beyond the 
government of Tunisia? So for example the World Bank which is contributing a 
lot of funding for this organization and how yesterday we heard about the World 
Bank for the Environment which is injecting 6 million dinars. So how are these 
connections made from the international level to places like Chebika?  
#1: We’re going to just focus on potable water. Even himself he went to the water 
headquarters in Tozeur and spoke to the director there on how to ease the 
transport of potable water to the Chebika area. And the director suggested that 
could be done with the world bank if the locals, civil society here could get 
funding from the World Bank or grants in order to make this project become a 
reality. He was told by the manager of the water company that this is extremely 
difficult to fulfill and he thinks that even with international organizations this is 
not something that might happen any time in the future.  
ITS: Why? 
#1: World Bank projects are not integrated within state budgets. For example, 
there are projects dealing with the rehabilitation of the old town or of the touristic 
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track. This could be done, but the Tunisian government must take its own share 
in that project. The example of potable water – the World Bank when he came to 
Chebika he saw that there was a problem with potable water and suggested that 
he would help them with the establishment of a sanitation station in Chebika and 
when the project started (in 2010) they thought that it will be a serious project 
that will start on good basis but unfortunately it did not come to good fruition 
ever since.  
Interview 2 
4/23/2016 – Interview with head of local agricultural society 
Huda Mzioudet, translator 
#2: He is a civil society activist with a … project that is funded by the World 
Bank for Environment through an agreement with the Ministry of Environment 
and Sustainable Development. As a civil society activist he helps with the 
organization of different projects here in different industries including 
agriculture, tourism, culture, and development. Agriculture is the most important 
thing. 
ITS: What are the major challenges facing agriculture and farming in the oasis 
today? 
#2: The main challenges are regarding the scattered ownership within the oasis 
and the aging of the oasis in Chebika since this oasis dates back for thousands of 
years. The main issue in Chebika is regarding the output or the decreasing 
production from the agricultural activities in the oasis and that unfortunately 
drove a lot of farmers away from the oasis and from agricultural activity in 
general. So this project came in order to bring the farmers back to the oasis in 
order to try and improve the production – the agricultural production. This 
includes, for example, the rejuvenation of the oasis, the adoption of this three 
strata system in the oasis with palm tree production, fruit, and other vegetable 
production – so trying to diversify more the agricultural production in the oasis 
here in Chebika. 
ITS: What is the primary system of farming that is currently used as far as the 
prevalence of the khammes system still and the relationship between those who 
farm the land and who own the land? 
#2: In the past the work of the khammes was the most activity in the agricultural 
sector in Chebika whereby the livelihood of not only the khammes but also the 
farmer depends on that. Now his activity has become almost secondary if not 
unimportant because basically the land has been abandoned and so there is no 
more interest from the khammes to work in the oasis because he’s got other 
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activities to do in order to sustain himself and survive as a farmer. And sustain 
his family. 
ITS: So would you say generally there is a lack of interest in agriculture as a 
primary sector in Chebika today? 
#2: Yes - it’s become a secondary thing. Before 2011 tourism was the main staple 
of the economic sector in Chebika. Unfortunately, after the Tunisian Revolution 
unfortunately with the crisis with the terrorist attacks a lot of young people 
abandoned the tourism sector and now they’re trying to get back to the 
agricultural activity in the oasis. 
ITS: Is there a sense of nostalgia for this time – the simpler time – before major 
changes at Chebika, before the relocation of the city when agriculture was a 
central part of life. Is there a sense of nostalgia for that and does he view his 
organization as attempting to return to a system similar to what was used then or 
is it an attempt to further modernize the system? 
#2: He would like to see something similar regarding the agricultural activity as 
was the case in the past particularly with the presence of women in this sector. In 
the past women were present in the agriculture activity in the oasis growing 
vegetables and other stable products and so their contribution to the development 
of the oasis was huge. Unfortunately, that’s not the case now, they have almost 
no role in the rejuvenation or the development of the oasis and he would like to 
see more of the women contribution in the development of the oasis. 
ITS: Could you talk a little bit if you’re familiar and comfortable with discussing 
it, the 1969 attempt at land collectivization and what effect that had on farming. 
#2: Basically he doesn’t really have a lot of familiarity. Since he does not really 
have a lot of knowledge of that, but from what he gathered the collectivization 
experience has worked mostly with the northwest of Tunisia but not in the 
southwest of Tunisia. 
ITS: So in doing the work for the rejuvenation of the oasis do you find that the 
government of Tunisia is helpful to you in this process or is it more often an 
obstacle or just not a source of assistance generally. 
#2: Regarding the oasis, there was an agreement with the regional administration 
of agriculture that depends on the Minister of Agriculture here in the area to for 
the rejuvenation of the oasis basically regarding the diagnosis for example of 
different palm trees and trying to see if there are different palm trees that have 
maybe some issues maybe they are aging or they have illnesses so to try and find 
a cure to that. So that’s basically one of the ways how the government tried to 
intervene to help with the oasis. Within the ministry of agriculture there’s a 
research center that collects data on all of the palm trees in the oasis especially 
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regarding the ones that are facing the problem of extinction and disappearing. So 
they collect those like DNA data bank. And so they collect all the information 
regarding different types of palm trees. And so through these the data it could try 
and prevent the death of certain palm trees and produce other palm trees through 
those data. 
ITS: What are options or possibilities that have been considered to confront the 
issues surrounding scattered land ownership? 
#2: So far there is nothing – we don’t have some kind of local governance 
regarding this issue of scattered land ownership. The problem is that this issue of 
scattered ownership is making a lot of farmers to almost leave the oasis and no 
longer working on – abandoning the oasis. We probably have to wait until we 
have more control over the local – over this issue as a part of local democracy 
and local governance. In 2015 there was a strategy by which they signed some 
kind of contract with the national contract for the production of oases which was 
signed between civil society organizations and activists and also relevant 
department administration through the Ministry of Environment. 
ITS: Anything else that you would like to add? 
#2: Even before the revolution there were attempts at getting assistance from 
abroad – basically from a Swiss Bank in 2006 that tried to address this issue. 
Now with the World Bank for Development they’ve got his 4-year project 
between 2015 and 2019 through the auspices of the Tunisian Ministry of the 
Environment and they set up this project on the sustainable management of the 
oasis ecosystem in Tunisia. If we get more funds allocated to projects for the 
protection of cultural activity or the oasis, then we’ll probably stop. For this 
project to be sustained in the future, for example one project regarding cleaning 
of the oasis for which we bought vans to clean the oasis that’s something that 
would make this project sustained in the future and help us in this activity. 
Interview 3 
4/22/2016 with head of local farmers’ union 
Huda Mzioudet, translator 
ITS: Primary job or function of your organization? 
#3: Defends the rights of the farmers in coordination with the Minister of 
Agriculture. Originally an employee of the Ministry of Education. 
ITS: Have you lived your whole life in this area? 
#3: Yes, he’s a farmer and has his own plot of land. 
ITS: How old is your organization? 
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#3: Since 1956, it is a part of the National Union of Farmers. There is a local 
office here in Tameghza and a regional office in Tozeur. 
ITS: What sort of rights do you find yourself defending on behalf of the farmers? 
#3: We primarily deal with working with the land itself. And the role of the 
Farmer’s Union is to defend the rights of anyone who either owns the land or 
works the land. And after the recent changes after the revolution, the union has 
taken a more proactive role in participating in policy, decision making, strategy 
for land ownership and other related…the only sector that has resisted after this 
change in Tunisia is the agriculture sector. Unfortunately, the tourism sector 
almost died. Services have weakened. Tunisia has always been self-sufficient so 
it does not need foreign manpower in agriculture which is something I want to 
focus on. For example, now Tunisia is the #1 producer of olive oil in the world 
(since 2015).  
ITS: Is it most common for workers to farm the land that they own, or do most 
farmers work land owned by other people? 
#3: Usually it is more farmers who are owning and using their own lands. That’s 
usually how most farmers in Tunisia are. They primarily farm small sectors in 
small plots of land. This is along the livestock raising. In the last 4 years raising 
livestock has developed by 150%. As for raising dromedaries and camels the 
government allocates or gives credits that can be paid over 7 years for each 
farmer to have 10 heads of camels to encourage farmers to invest in that sector.  
ITS: From what I’ve read of Chebika’s history specifically, prior to its relocation 
(1960’s) many of the farmers did not own the land that they were farming, there 
were a lot of landowners from Tameghza, from Redayif, and the nomads who 
owned this land. How has that changed? 
#3: To correct that Tameghza as a town has existed at least 1800 years and that 
my own father has owned land since 1937 even the residents have all owned land 
before 1960s. These are lands that have been inherited from their forefathers that 
goes over 2 centuries ago.  
ITS: Throughout the colonial period, were these lands taken away or nationalized 
at any point? Has it been seamless ownership or have there been periods of 
interruption? 
#3: Even under the French colonial system there were people who still owned 
land here. So there was not expropriation of their land. In 1969 there was the 
experience of collectivization with Ahmed ben Salah. 1969. They nationalized 
the lands and they collected them, all the farmers, under the form of union of 
different farmers all owning the lands. 1970 that experience has failed so people 
they returned to the previous exploitation of their own land without any state 
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interventions. To stress a little bit more that private ownership is not something 
new in Tameghza and the neighboring areas. This has always been the case. 
ITS: How common – primarily farmers are farming their own land. But how 
common is it for farmers to hire in work – to hire in their labor? 
#3: In the case of Tozeur, Tameghza, and the surrounding areas they are not large 
plots of land. The largest would not exceed 3 or 4 hectares and they are mostly 
palm tree lands. 5 or 6 years ago you had something like an indentured servant 
who would be hired to work after the land and tend the palm trees or the oasis 
and he will get 1/5th of the crop. A khammes. Right now he will get paid in cash 
no longer does he get his own share from the crop that he has been working on 
for the whole year. Basically this farming or agricultural sector has become a 
secondary activity – more and more people are looking for alternative activities 
for example in masonry or service sector. But they still keep working on the land, 
but it’s no longer the primary activity as it has been in the past. Chebika and 
Tameghza they have similar issues and the same characteristics when it comes to 
farming. 
ITS: How prevalent today still is the khammes system? 
#3: It’s almost extinct. Because the standard of living has developed. Almost 
everyone does not need the services of a khammes because it is not sustainable 
enough. 
ITS: Historically when it was a more prevalent system the khammes – did they 
usually live in the same towns? Were they people who didn’t own land that were 
hired to work on the land? What was the relationship historically in this area 
between the khammes and those who did own the land? 
#3: It was mainly a relationship of an employee to his employer it was not a 
status of servitude or anything like that. There was no over-exploitation of the 
khammes by his employer. 
ITS: So if there was a plot of land in Chebika, the khammes were usually also 
from Chebika? 
#3: Usually the khammes was a local. If someone is coming from outside they 
would need housing and because transportation, it’s very hard. Transport system 
is not very developed. Things have developed, now people can live in Chebika 
and work in Tozeur and vice-versa. 
ITS: So is there any significant or tangible changes to land ownership, farming, 
etc. from the old city to when they city was relocated? Chebika specifically? Was 
there any change to the general concept of land ownership relative to the 
resettlement of the village? 
Sciford 42 
 
#3: Regarding Chebika the plot of land has preserved its geographical location. 
There was no urban encroachment. So what happened with the Chebika locals is 
that they slightly left the old town and lived next to the old town while preserving 
the oasis system. And this has been reinforced by the state’s policy of banning 
any urban planning or construction in the oasis. No houses. Or in the farming 
land. In most of the almost of all of the oases are found in the south of Tunisia. 
And the best quality of dates is found in Tameghza.  
ITS: The relocation of many of these mountain oases that happened in the 1960s, 
today is it looked at by the residents as a voluntary action as a beneficial action or 
as a decision imposed by the government? 
#3: It was a natural development because of the development of life in general 
and the standard of living. For example, the way that the old town has been built 
originally they were built using clay now they are using concrete and steel. The 
old town basically was built using wood and clay whereas the new town has the 
modern life and in Chebika you have modern houses with internet and modern 
TVs (plasmas). You have bloggers, you have people who are activating the 
culture industry.  
ITS: As specific as possible the year the relocation in Chebika and Tameghza 
happened? 
#3: 1969 there were floods. This is when they started to…and because of those 
floods a lot of those houses were flooded so a lot of people thought about 
building new houses outside of the old town.  
ITS: The people who still live in Chebika or Tameghza are a lot of them the same 
families as before or has there been an increase in people coming in? 
#3: The number of population has not changed mostly. Even if people are leaving 
Tameghza just for studying most of the time. There are also some Tameghza and 
Chebika locals who have migrated for example to Europe. Also employees or 
civil service who work outside of Chebika in certain areas. And if they come 
back it is very likely that the land cannot be sufficient for them to live on. 
ITS: What would you say have been the most significant changes to life between 
the old city and the new city? Has there been any cultural shift or anything along 
those lines? 
#3: The main change was touristic. Chebika has become the main resort for 
tourism industry. This has effected the tourism – the tourism industry has effected 
the agricultural industry. A lot of young people they are no longer interested in 
working on the land. 4 years before the revolution Chebika would receive 4,000 
tourists every day from all over the world.  
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ITS: So now that tourism is down again is there a re-emerging importance to the 
land and agriculture? Has there been a readjustment of the importance of the 
land? Now that tourism is less prevalent is agriculture more important once 
again?  
#3: Right now there is some return to the rejuvenation of oasis in Chebika. More 
and more people there. There is re----- of agriculture through livestock. 
Dromedaries and camel raising. Rejuvenation of palm trees. The maintenance of 
water sources. Manufacturing of fertilizers. And encouraging artisans by 
providing them with small credits. Caring for women issues. Giving her a small 
grant in order for her to be able to raise for example rabbits. Livestock, rabbits, or 
handicrafts. Basically people are going back now to agriculture because for them 
this is the only solid sector that is able to sustain them. And even during 
conference and seminars that I’ve been attending the state has been encouraging 
the return to agricultural as the only solid sector for the region.  
Interview 4 
4/23/2016 with local activist 
Huda Mzioudet, translator 
ITS: What is your name and what do you do? 
#4: He is a local of Chebika, his father used to be a farmer. He is currently 
working in the Ministry of Finance and he helps with the association here. 
ITS: What do you believe are the biggest challenges that Chebika today faces? 
#4: The main challenges that Chebika has been facing – there are two. Drought 
and the tourism sector.  
ITS: Have you lived in Chebika your whole life? 
#4: Yes 
ITS: Your father was a farmer – have you been a participant in the agriculture 
sector in Chebika yourself? 
#4: He used to help his father a lot. Especially with crop date collection also with 
wheat and other agriculture products.  
ITS: When he is considering some of the problems in Chebika today, how does 
he believe they can be fixed? 
#4: There are two issues. Potable water – if that issue is solved that will alleviate 
many of the issues that Chebika is facing. The second issue is that of land for 
construction use – if the issue of those lands is solved that will help alleviate 
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issues regarding the territorial distribution of lands and also find solutions to the 
demographic distribution here of the population in Chebika. 
ITS: What specific actions are being taken either by this organization or 
individuals in Chebika to address these issues? 
#4: We suggested to the state for example as to how to deal with the potable 
water and the other main issue is how we suggested to the state how to solve the 
issue of collective lands. So instead of for example people being allocated lands 
from different tribes or different families, that the state will take an active role in 
the distribution of those lands. 
ITS: Would you say that you feel there has been support from the government on 
these issues? 
#4: The government helped for example in the project of potable water they spent 
money on this project. The problem was with the entrepreneurs who did not 
approve the final project. 
ITS: Were those entrepreneurs from Chebika? 
#4: They were from different areas but mainly from Sidi Bouzid and other areas 
in Tunisia. 
ITS: Anything else you would like to contribute on this topic? 
#4: Regarding civil society here in Chebika we would welcome that there would 
be some kind of – regarding projects in general – that certain areas there needs to 
be awareness of the specificities of certain areas because certain projects would 
be done differently for example in rural areas from in urban areas so if there’s 
respect to the specificities for these areas in any type of project that should be 
considered. And also the issue of trust is very important in carrying out any 
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